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Introduction
Most fisheries in South and Southeast 
Asia (SSEA) have been experiencing 
a biological decline, mainly due 
to growing fishing pressure.  The 
fisheries are a source of food and 
income for the growing number 
of fishing households living at the 
subsistence level in the region.  The 
fisheries are also under pressure 
from the commercialization and 
commoditization of fish in the 
global market, as well as from 
other development, industrial 
and recreational uses of this 
natural resource and its adjacent 
environment.  The 2004 tsunami that 
hit the region brought destruction 
to the already problematic state of 
fishers’ lives and livelihoods, as well 
as the fisheries and other coastal 
resources in the region (Pauly 2005). 
Given all these factors, stakeholders 
and institutions involved in natural 
resources management are faced 
1 Updated version of the paper delivered during the Regional Consolidation Workshop of the Fish Fights over Fish Rights project of 
the WorldFish Center, held at IRRI, Philippines, 17-20 May 2005. Updates mainly include final project results.
Location of study sites in the South 
and Southeast Asian region. 
Abstract
Fisheries conflicts are among the persistent problems affecting the security of food, livelihoods 
and fishing environments crucial to poor fishing communities in developing countries in South 
and Southeast Asia.  Most conflicts arise from excessive fishing efforts due to increasing population 
and economic motivations. Conflicts are not all undesirable as some disputes become a catalyst for 
much needed reforms for policy and economic improvements. However, a framework for analyzing 
conflicts in fisheries is necessary to organize interventions relevant to the nature of conflicts, and 
the needs and capacities of fisheries stakeholders in the region. The WorldFish Center, together with 
research partners, conducted studies that identify a framework for managing fisheries conflicts.  
Thematic policy recommendations for managing fishing capacity and related conflicts in small-scale 
fisheries in the region are identified for further consideration by fisheries stakeholders. 
with serious conflicts. Conflicts are 
broadly defined as a situation of non-
cooperation between parties with 
contradictory objectives (FAO 1998). 
Conflicts in fisheries in SSEA are 
often viewed in the context of the 
allocation or access rights to the 
limited resources among stakeholders 
with diverging economic and social 
motivations.  However, they are 
often far more complex because of 
the multiple socio-economic factors, 
such as institutional and market 
failures, that add to the conflicts 
(Ahmed et al. 1998;  Torell and 
News Stra
its Times, 
 April 8, 20
00. p.14
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Salamanca 2002). Conflicts arising 
from gear use, landing site use or 
market behavior are not primarily 
about resource allocation.  They are 
rooted in more complex institutional 
issues such as cultural differences and 
political power struggles (Bennett 
et al. 2001).  These concerns are 
among the many broad targets of key 
international instruments such as the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, and the 
formulation of the International  
Plan of Action for the Management  
of Fishing Capacity.
The WorldFish Center initiated two 
projects to better understand conflicts 
in fisheries and the associated 
threats to the sustainability of fishery 
resources and human survival in 
selected developing countries in SSEA. 
The emphasis of the two projects 
was on the recognition of the 
importance of documenting conflicts 
and the identification of options for 
managing the problems that create 
these conflicts.  This paper provides 
a summary of selected highlights 
of the two projects on fisheries 
conflict management executed by The 
WorldFish Center in collaboration 
with research partners situated 
in areas in SSEA where there are 
fisheries conflicts.  The two projects 
identified study sites in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, India, the Philippines and 
Thailand.  Both projects started in 
2003 and were completed in July 2005.
Fish Fights over Fish Rights Project
The project aimed to improve 
understanding of the dynamics of 
conflicts arising from excess capacity 
and to recommend management 
options for managing fishing capacity 
and conflicts in small-scale fisheries 
in the region.  Case studies were 
conducted in eight fishing villages 
experiencing a range of conflicts. In 
Cambodia, the three sites included 
were:  Tamol Leu village in Pursat 
province representing the small-
scale inland fishery in Tonle Sap 
Lake;  Kampong Chhnang village in 
Kandal province representing the 
riparian fisheries in the Mekong 
areas; and Doun Toak village in 
Kampot province near the west Thai 
border representing coastal fisheries 
in the northwest of the Gulf of 
Thailand.  In the vast fishing grounds 
of the Philippine archipelago, three 
fishing villages in the municipalities 
of Concepcion in Iloilo province, 
Escalante in Negros Occidental 
province and Daan-Bantayan in Cebu 
province were selected to represent 
the many coastal fishers that run in 
conflict with each other in the Visayan 
Sea.  Finally, Bo Daeng and Na Tub 
fishing villages in Songkhla province in 
Thailand were selected to represent 
the coastal fishing communities 
where multi-species small-scale 
fishers have problems with the 
commercial anchovy fishers.
The WorldFish Center collaborated 
with the Inland Fisheries Research 
and Development Institute (IFReDI) 
of the Department of Fisheries, 
Cambodia; the University of the 
Philippines Visayas (UPV), Philippines; 
the Coastal Resources Institute 
(CORIN) of the Prince of Songkhla 
University and the Southern Marine 
Fisheries Development Center 
(SMDEC) of the Department of 
Fisheries, Thailand to implement the 
project with a research grant from 
the Ford Foundation.  The GTZ 
provided funds for the conduct of a 
regional consolidation workshop that 
was instrumental in bringing together 
experiences in conflicts and fisheries 
management and provided a venue 
for developing methods for resolving 
these conflicts. 
Enabling Better Management of 
Fisheries Conflicts Project
The Fish Fights over Fish Rights 
project initiatives were 
complemented by this second project. 
It focused on determining the most 
appropriate ways of communicating 
good practice for managing fisheries 
conflicts, promoting key lessons and 
practices from earlier projects on 
conflict and consensus building and, 
finally, on adapting and demonstrating 
these practices in study sites where 
conflicts often disadvantaged poor 
fishers.  The project had a goal of 
conducting uptake methods for 
government and NGO workers who 
are involved in fisheries management. 
To achieve these adaptive research 
and communications objectives, 
seven study sites in freshwater and 
marine environments in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia and India were selected. 
This two-year conflict management 
project started in July 2003 in 
collaboration with the Fisheries 
Action Coalition Team (FACT) in 
Cambodia, Mitraniketan in India, 
and the WorldFish Center Regional 
Office in Bangladesh.  The project 
was funded by the Department for 
International Development of the 
United Kingdom (DFID-UK).
Framework for Analyzing 
Conflicts
Theoretical Background
Why are there conflicts in fisheries? 
What drives fishers and other 
stakeholders to conflicts? Charles 
(1992) provided a framework 
for analyzing conflicts in fisheries 
by introducing a trio of fishery 
paradigms, i.e., conservation, 
rationalization and social paradigms 
(Fig. 1).  These three paradigms and 
the policy objective (or development 
priorities) at which most groups 
of fishery resource users operate 
explain why there are conflicts. 
The three corners of the triangle 
represent the extreme cases of the 
three philosophical paradigms and 
their unique policy objectives.  The 
conservation paradigm operates 
with a policy objective centered 
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on resource maintenance or 
conservation.  This paradigm is based 
on the premise that the primary duty 
of the fishery manager is to take care 
of the fish, and fishers are viewed 
as a “predatory fleet” that must be 
directly managed through restrictive 
fishing hours, fishing location, fishing 
effort and catch quota.  
The rationalization paradigm 
emphasizes the pursuit of economic 
performance and productivity. 
The policy context related to 
this paradigm is founded on the 
assumption that society should 
seek to maximize fishery rents, 
comprising economic benefits over 
and above payments to fishers and 
vessels; and those fisheries that 
cannot attain this objective are 
“supposed to be rationalized”.  
The social or community paradigm 
focuses on fishers as members of 
coastal communities, rather than 
as components of a fishing fleet. 
It focuses on community welfare, 
distributional equity, and other social 
and cultural fishery benefits.  Charles 
noted that this paradigm tends to 
be popular among fishers’ unions, 
fishing cooperatives and those 
living in or involved with fishing 
communities.  However, these groups 
were underrepresented among the 
staff and management of government 
fishery administrations during the 
time of his research.  More recently, 
there has been an overwhelming 
interest in this paradigm and the 
“advocacy” element in this paradigm 
has contributed to a better 
understanding of its policy objectives 
even at the lower levels of the policy-
making hierarchy.
Conflicts arise when the many 
dynamic interactions among natural 
resources, humans and institutions 
contradict each other because  
of the underlying differences in 
priorities pursued by various  
fisheries players. Charles (1992) 
organized the wide range of fisheries 
conflicts into four interrelated 
categories: (i) fishery jurisdiction;  
(ii) management mechanisms;  
(iii) internal allocation; and  
(iv) external allocation.  These 
categories were intended to be 
comprehensive but not mutually 
exclusive. In a more recent study, 
Bennett et al. (2001) extended the 
four conflict categories into five to 
include conflicts between fishers and 
those outside the fishery (Table 1).
The ‘Fish Fights over Fish Rights’ 
Conceptual Framework
Noting this conflict paradigm in 
the SSEA fisheries context, Fig. 2 
illustrates the conceptual framework 
developed and used by the Fish 
Fights over Fish Rights project and 
provides the background for the 
Enabling Better Management of 
Fisheries Conflicts project.  The 
framework mainly derived from the 
Driver-Problem-Issue-Intervention 
analysis that put into context the 
dynamics of the variables that would 
potentially address the objectives of 
the two conflict management studies. 
This conceptual framework evolved 
through the analysis of outcomes 
of case studies and through debates 
in national and regional stakeholder 
consultations organized by the Fish 
Fights over Fish Rights project.
Considering that both studies 
deal with conflicts associated with 
scarcity of and competition for 
fishery resources in the region, the 
main conflict drivers fall under three 
categories: (i) policies, institutions for 
governance and property rights;  
(ii) population increase and poverty; 
and (iii) economic incentives/markets 
and new/improved technology. 
The state of these variables with 
reference to the fisheries sector in 
each country was reviewed in order 
to identify the circumstances that 
drive the excess capacity problem 
in the fisheries sector in the region 
in general.  Fig. 2 also features the 
local and national security concerns 
such as fisher’s livelihood, food 
security, degradation of fishery habitat 
and stocks, and risk to the lives of 
enforcers.  Finally, the framework 
presents categories of management 
and policy interventions that 
hypothetically offer opportunities for 
addressing the issues and the excess 
fishing capacity problem.  The options 
were broadly grouped into three 
categories: (i) strategies for exit from 
the fisheries; (ii) review of policies 
and institutions; and (iii) information, 
education and communication (IEC).  
Among these three groups of 
interventions, the Fish Fights 
over Fish Rights project focused 
Figure 1. Framework for understanding and resolving conflicts.
Conservation paradigm
Rationalization paradigm
Conservation/resource maintenance
Economic performance/productivity Community welfare/equity
Community welfare paradigm 
Conflict
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework for addressing excess capacity in small-scale fisheries in Southeast Asia with reference to 
strategies for exit as interventions that consider conflict management measures.
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on determining and evaluating 
potential strategies for exit from 
the fisheries.  This focus was 
intended to contribute to efforts to 
reduce excess fishing pressure and 
consequently ease conflict resolution 
or eliminate disputes and threats to 
security.  Meanwhile, the Enabling 
Better Management of Fisheries 
Conflicts project focused on the 
IEC interventions by developing 
simple communication strategies and 
tools to guide conflict assessment, 
negotiations and development of a 
consensus building attitude among 
stakeholders.  The project also applied 
other tools such as the Participatory 
Institutional Survey and Conflict 
Evaluation Exercise called PISCES 
(Bennett et al. 2001) and noted 
the Rapid Appraisal of Fisheries 
Management Systems developed 
earlier by ICLARM (Pido et al. 1996).
Result Highlights 
Conflicts, Typologies and Linkages 
with Excess Fishing Capacity
Results of these two projects 
ascertained the existence of a variety 
of conflicts associated with declining 
fishery resources.  In all eight case 
study sites, excess fishing capacity 
was indicated by modified stocks 
and catches composed mainly of 
juveniles and fewer high-value fishes; 
decreasing quantity and quality of 
catch;  increasing number of fishers 
and boats; fishers fishing farther away; 
and emerging conflicts among various 
resource users.  These indicators 
were parallel to the results of 
biological assessments that showed 
exploitation levels of commercial fish 
species to be beyond the optimum 
range as most fisheries in the region 
were harvested up to maximum 
biological levels (Silvestre et al. 2003).  
The conflicts in the study sites 
were attributed to competition for 
access/ownership rights, issues of 
subsistence, economic profits and 
institutional weaknesses in the small-
scale fisheries sector in SSEA. In 
Cambodia, conflicts in inland fisheries 
centered on poor governance 
as demonstrated by the weak 
implementation of policies, notably 
the Sub-Decree on Community 
Fisheries, on the allocation of fishing 
lots among commercial interest 
groups and a growing subsistence 
populace.  Conflicts in coastal marine 
fisheries were about competition 
for productive fishing grounds and 
species targeted by gears used 
by small-scale fishers and large 
commercial operators. 
Conflicts in the floodplains in 
Bangladesh had some similarities with 
those in Cambodia.  The diversity of 
products and livelihood opportunities 
in the rivers and floodplains in 
Bangladesh attract many users and 
stakeholders, but the stagnating 
inland fishery harvests set the 
conflict scenario.  There has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of 
new fishers eking a living from shared 
resources with traditional fishers. 
Control of the fisheries, especially 
by curtailing illegal fishing practices 
by politically influential users and 
the weakness of institutions became 
major causes of disputes.
The conflicts in the Philippines, 
Thailand and India were similar in 
terms of disputes between small- 
and large-scale fishers in capture 
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 Table 1. Fisheries conflicts in study sites in Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
Typology of 
Conflicts
Parties involved and specific conflict issue
Cambodia Philippines Thailand Bangladesh India
Type I 
Who controls the 
fishery 
(access issues)
Community fishers 
vs. large fishing lot 
owners and  medium-
scale fishers over 
access rights on 
designated zones by 
type of fishery
Small-scale fishers vs. 
commercial fishers 
and fishery regulatory 
bodies over zoning 
of fishing grounds to 
delineate access by 
category of fishers
Large vs. small-
scale fishers over 
rights and access to 
designated zones by 
type of fishery and 
use of light luring 
and modern fishing 
gears by large-scale 
fishers
Traditional fishers 
vs. katha (brush fish 
aggregating device) 
owners over fishing 
access
Conflict due to 
pseudo-property 
(due to residency 
/ancestral) rights 
among small-scale 
fishers
Traditional vs. 
mechanized fishers 
who venture in 8 
km inshore waters 
allocated for 
traditional fishers
Type II
How are the fisheries 
controlled
Community and 
medium-scale fishers 
vs. large fishing lot 
owners, on over-
enforcement of rules 
by lot owners who 
utilize military force
Fishers vs. fisheries 
officials, local 
authorities, illegal 
fishers over poor 
governance (weak 
action on illegal 
fishing, sale of public 
fishing areas, etc.)
Small-scale fishers vs. 
commercial fishers 
and sea patrols 
over variable levels 
of patrolling and 
enforcement of the 
latter that favor 
commercial fishers 
who can afford 
penalties
Commercial trawlers, 
push netters 
vs. regulatory 
agencies over lack 
of enforcement to 
control the number 
of fishing vessels 
and limit entry 
and operation of 
destructive gears
Legal fishers vs. 
illegal gear operators 
over lack of 
enforcement on use 
of illegal gears
Fishers vs. state 
government on mesh 
size regulation
Type III
Relations between 
the fishery users
(linguistic, religion, 
ethnic, scale of 
fishing)
Rivalry between ethic 
groups
Community fishers vs. 
outsider illegal fishers 
on poaching inside 
community fishing 
areas
Local artisanal vs. 
migrant commercial 
fishermen over access 
and competition on 
fishing zones
Rivalry between 
resident small-
scale vs. migrant 
large-scale anchovy  
fishers over 
legitimacy of access 
and destruction of 
gears
Traditional and new 
fishers compete for 
riverine resources 
Fishers vs. Beel 
Management 
Committee (BMC)
Traditional fishers
complain over use 
of ring seines by 
mechanized fishers
Type IV
Relations between 
fishers and other 
users of the aquatic 
environment 
(fishing vs. tourism 
and similar water 
resource-based 
industries)
Lowland farmers vs. 
fishers over access 
and use of water and 
inundated forest
Fishery and sectors 
such as tourism, 
navigation/ docking, 
sand quarrying and 
mariculture over 
varying use of aquatic 
resources
Rice farmers vs. 
prawn breeders over 
resource use
None reported in 
case study area
Traditional vs. 
mechanized fishers 
and hatchery 
operators over 
collection of prawn 
brooders 
Fishers vs.  
government and 
industries on 
discharge of effluents; 
also tourism 
Type V
Relationship between 
fishers and non–
fishery issues
Fishers vs. law 
enforcement 
authorities over 
lack of proper 
management and 
poor enforcement due 
to weak institutional 
structures
Fishers vs. 
government 
authorities over 
variable standards 
in management and 
enforcement arising 
from devolution 
of functions and 
overlapping 
institutional 
structures
Fishers vs. 
government 
authorities over 
lack of proper 
management and 
enforcement
Conflicts due to 
overlapping of 
functions and 
weak institutional 
structure at various 
levels
Fishers vs. 
government 
on overlapping 
functions of agencies 
and weak structure at 
various government 
levels
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marine fisheries.  In the Visayan Sea 
in the Philippines, these conflicts 
had worsened due to the national 
fisheries policy, known as the 1998 
Fisheries Code, which excluded 
large-scale fleets from fishing zones 
within 15 km from the shoreline.  
Large-scale fishers contested the 
government on the fairness of 
the regulation, while small-scale 
fishers protested against the poor 
implementation of such regulations as 
evidenced by the unchecked intrusion 
of large-scale fishers in near-shore 
waters.  This legitimacy of access 
issues bred other forms of disputes, 
from fishing gear entanglements 
(where active gears destroys passive 
fixed gears of the small-scale fishers), 
to threats to the lives of village-level 
volunteer coast guards arising from 
altercations with large-scale illegal 
gear operators.
 
At the Gulf of Songkhla in Southern 
Thailand, fishing zones had been 
demarcated for all gears under the 
National Committee for Fisheries 
Policy by the Department of 
Fisheries.  The policy was intended 
to address problems of overcapacity 
and avert potential conflicts between 
commercial anchovy fishers and 
operators of other small-scale gears. 
The anchovy fishing operators, 
however, contended that their way 
of fishing was not detrimental to the 
resource and livelihoods of small-
scale fishers and challenged the 
government-imposed ban on gears 
they used.
In India, the main conflicts in the 
study areas arose from competition 
for access to the shared fishery 
resources, in particular, the 
encroachment of mechanized boats 
in the area within 8 km from the 
shore allocated for traditional 
fishers.  Other disputes were due 
to use of small mesh nets, trawling 
in breeding grounds and weak 
market structure.  Conflicts also 
arose over the pollution caused by 
effluent discharges and oil spills from 
various industries.  Tourism was also 
noted as a cause of conflict between 
promoters and traditional fishers.
Table 1 gives a summary of conflicts 
divided into five categories:  
(i) rights and access; (ii) enforcement 
of regulations; (iii) fishery group-
related disputes; (iv) non-fishery  
use of fishery resources; and  
(v) non-fishery concerns affecting  
the fishery.  Conflicts were 
categorized according to these 
five typologies to find patterns/
relationships between typologies and 
corresponding management/policy 
options.  Such patterns, if they exist, 
can facilitate the formulation of 
conclusions and recommendations.
Security Threats Arising from 
Fisheries Conflicts
In the Fish Fights over Fish Rights 
project, further evaluation of conflicts 
observed in the case study sites 
showed some pattern of relationship 
between conflict type and the nature 
of threats that could potentially arise 
from such conflicts (Salayo et al. 
2006).  Type I conflicts (Fig. 3) tended 
to create threats to the overall 
health of the fishery resources.  The 
stakeholders believed that if Type I 
conflicts were not addressed, the 
“non-owners” or outsiders who gain 
access to the fishery would conduct 
illegal and “harmful” practices to 
obtain maximum benefits at intensive 
exploitation levels.  In addition, food 
security was threatened by fishing 
rights being sold to other ‘outsider’ 
fishers.  Type II conflicts included 
those that manifest themselves 
due to lack of enforcement and 
implementation of regulations. 
The lack of clarity and purpose of 
regulations was listed as reason for 
violations and conflicts.  For example, 
the establishment of marine protected 
areas (MPAs) as conservation measure 
is a trend in the Philippines.  However, 
the lack information on the purpose 
Interview with fishers in the Visayan Sea, 
Philippines, July 2004.
Anchovy fishing boat operating in the 
Gulf of Songkhla, Southern Thailand.
The Anlong Raing floating village in Tonle 
Sap, Cambodia is home to many fishers 
relying on implementation of the Sub-
Decree on Community Fisheries.
Coastal area in Andra Pradesh India 
where traditional and mechanized 
fishers and their families compete for 
marine resources.
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for those affected created conflicts, 
as MPAs restricted access and limited 
fishing areas for most fishers.  The 
fishers perceived it as a threat to their 
livelihoods and food security.  
Type III conflicts especially those 
between fishers using basic gears and 
other fishers using more efficient 
but illegal and destructive gears. 
can result in degradation of fishery 
habitat and stocks and consequently 
loss of livelihood and subsistence. 
Similarly, Type IV conflicts may 
also ruin the environment.  Type V 
conflicts occur when non-fishery 
issues that do not directly use fishery 
resources nevertheless affect the 
fishery significantly.  Such conflicts 
have been reported in Cambodia and 
the Philippines, where fishers had 
disputes with law enforcers, including 
government fishery officers.  Apart 
from fomenting disrespect for the law 
and the law-makers and enforcers 
among fishing communities, such 
conflicts also result in more serious 
ramifications such as a politicization 
of policies related to fisheries and 
fishing communities and a lack of 
political determination.  Both these 
phenomena were perceived to 
be detrimental, especially to the 
livelihoods of ‘unfavored’ fisher 
groups, as the destructive/illegal fishing 
operations of many of the politically 
favored groups were perceived as 
threats to the survival of the fishery.  
Challenges and 
Directions 
The two projects on conflicts in 
capture fisheries in inland and marine 
environments indicate that conflict 
management should be embedded 
in natural resource management. 
In particular, options for managing 
excess fishing capacity should involve 
measures for understanding and 
managing conflicts and the  
associated threats.
In recognition of the challenges, the 
sector is expected to persist on 
its important and immediate goals 
of, among others: (i) protection of 
fishery resources and conservation of 
fishery habitats; and (ii) development 
through provision of sustainable 
livelihoods to marginalized groups 
in the fishery sector.  To achieve 
these goals, providing specific action 
plans to the policy and management 
interventions proposed in this paper 
are viewed as the challenges and 
directions that may pave the way for 
obtaining positive outcomes from 
conflicts and for elimination and 
resolution of negative conflicts. 
Strategic Exit from the Fisheries: A 
Way for Managing Excess Capacity
This is a sensitive issue of survival 
of the poor and marginalized 
fishers.  Large-scale commercial 
fishers find it difficult to exit as 
capital investment in fisheries is 
not easily transferable to other 
income-generating opportunities.  
A creation of awareness through 
information and communication 
strategies could establish the 
credibility of benefits arising from 
exit strategies.  The creation of 
sustainable alternative livelihoods 
is a challenge in resource-depleted 
and capital-deprived environments.  
Furthermore, the capacity to shift to 
other skills and work-styles is often 
limited among fishers.  Aquaculture 
is often perceived as an alternative 
for reducing capacity and fishing 
pressure while making fish available 
to the growing populations. However, 
aquaculture development has 
unintended negative impacts  
on various sectors when not  
applied responsibly.
Review of Policies and Institutions
The basic laws and regulations for 
managing fisheries are already in place 
in the countries included in this study. 
However, conflicts are prevalent 
because of the poor implementation 
and enforcement of most fishery laws 
and regulations. Thus, it is necessary 
to involve all stakeholders in the 
fishery and related sectors as well 
as the policy makers and fisheries 
managers in a thorough and periodic 
review of policies and institutions. 
Participatory management, 
Figure 3. Patterns of relationship between conflict type and nature of threats arising 
from such conflicts.
Food security
Livelihood (Income)
Environmental 
degradation
Threat to life
Type I Who controls the fishery
II How the fishery is controlled
III
Conflicts between the fishery 
users
IV
Conflicts between fishers and 
other resource users
V
Conflicts between fishers  and 
non-fishery issues
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governance at various levels and 
assignment of property rights are 
key issues that remain a challenge 
for managing excess capacity and 
conflicts in fisheries.  Policies are 
typically developed at the national 
level, with devolution of functions and 
co-management at the community 
and municipality level. However, in 
between these levels of governance, 
some efforts are dissipated (due to 
poor implementation mechanisms)  
and would need further studies  
and collaboration.
Information, Education and 
Communication (IEC)
Creating awareness of and promoting 
best practices for managing the 
fisheries, including mechanisms 
for consensus building in cases 
of conflicts, are priority areas 
in a comprehensive strategy for 
managing conflicts and exit in an 
overexploited fishery. Innovations 
in IEC methods are required to 
further the goals of environmental 
security and sustainability of the 
fisheries as these involve a more 
complicated inter-temporal and 
spatial dimension. For example, our 
empirical results showed that various 
types of conflicts arising from excess 
capacity have long-term implications 
for fishing livelihoods, food security, 
habitat and fish stocks.  How do IEC 
methods ensure that environmental 
security, including fisheries, would 
be recognized as a non-traditional 
security concern in the midst of real 
life circumstances where the rule of 
the state and use of military remain 
“visible” in the management and 
exploitation of the fishery, as largely 
reported in Cambodia’s fishing lot 
system?
In this context the challenge is to 
successfully involve the stakeholders 
and duty-holders in the chosen 
management options and ensure 
their sustained participation. 
Furthermore, when participation 
is hampered by diverging concerns, 
what are the mechanisms suitable 
for eliciting consensus and conflict 
resolution? Tools in conflict 
management such as consensus 
building are instruments that 
could be extended or modified to 
incorporate securitization in non-
traditional context (Salayo et al. 
2006).  ‘Interactive governance’ is 
defined as a process that comprises 
all of the interactions among 
stakeholders involved in addressing 
problems and creating opportunities. 
It must allow for pooling of 
specialized competencies and also 
for mutual interactive learning 
throughout the decision making 
process. However, to be accepted by 
all stakeholders and to be effective, 
governance needs to be transparent, 
equitable, legitimate and consistent 
(MARE undated brochure). In 
some countries in SSEA, interactive 
governance has taken place through 
the devolution of power for the 
management of the fishery to  
local government units and  
fishery agencies. 
There is a need for additional work 
to address cross-border fisheries 
conflicts and security issues across 
the globe. These issues are beyond 
the scope of the current study, yet 
relevant for another phase with 
a global and cross-country scope. 
Therefore, during the Regional 
Consolidation Workshop held from 
17-20 May 2005 in the Philippines, 
it was decided to draft a follow-up 
collaborative project.
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
The two WorldFish conflict 
management projects demonstrated 
that conflicts due to excess fishing 
capacity in the small-scale sector 
cut across the social and biological 
dimensions of managing the fisheries. 
This complexity reinforces the 
challenge for all stakeholders to 
develop the necessary management 
and policy interventions. The Fish 
Fights over Fish Rights project 
identified the following thematic 
policy recommendations for managing 
fishing capacity and related conflicts 
in small-scale fisheries in the region: 
Institutional partnership in 
research and development.
The academe and the government 
are encouraged to collaboratively 
undertake relevant research and 
development (R&D) programs; 
provide scientific/technical advice 
and other relevant information; and 
enhance institutional networking.
Building non-fishery human 
capacity to reduce fishing 
capacity. The government and 
NGOs are admonished to build 
capacity of institutions at all levels 
of governance; develop coordination 
and partnership among stakeholders; 
facilitate community organizations 
and development; act as key partners 
in sustainable resource management; 
participate actively in action programs 
at the local level; and secure access to 
resources for sustainable livelihood.
Promote and harmonize action 
plans through good governance.
Fishery agencies should formulate 
and implement a national plan of 
action for addressing over-capacity 
and resource use conflicts in fisheries; 
harmonize relevant plans of action 
at the international/regional levels; 
and promote collaboration in 
implementing international/regional 
action programs.
Advocate management 
interventions and politicize 
security threats. All groups of 
stakeholders, from fishers to  
policy-makers and academicians,  
are encouraged to promote a 
conducive policy climate; promote 
effective natural resource 
management; and support fisheries 
and resource management.
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The above policy recommendations 
are indicative of the need for an 
integrated approach to address 
overcapacity and fisheries conflicts. 
Some solutions to conflicts arising 
from overcapacity are beyond the 
fisheries sector.  Thus, under each 
policy recommendation are detailed 
action plans for managing fishing 
capacity and exit of some fishers 
from the fisheries.  These have to be 
adopted and implemented – singly or 
collectively – by various stakeholders. 
However, partnerships and collective 
efforts are preferred and encouraged 
to ensure comprehensiveness 
and multi-lateral understanding, 
and acceptability of measures for 
managing fishery resources and 
resolving conflicts. These policy 
recommendations evolved from the 
case studies and national/regional 
multi-stakeholder workshops 
attended by fishery stakeholders  
in the region.
Meanwhile, the Enabling Better 
Management of Conflicts project 
produced IEC materials for 
the implementation of planned 
strategies for managing fisheries 
conflicts.  One such output is a 
Fisheries Conflicts Communication 
Framework (FishCom) composed 
of tools for evaluating and managing 
conflicts.  Another output is an 
adaptation called the Participatory 
Action Plan Development (PAPD)-
Based Consensus Building Tool:  A 
Facilitator’s Guide, an outcome of 
collaboration on consensus building 
exercises with the Center for 
Natural Resources Studies (CNRS) 
in Bangladesh and a trial in India. 
The third is a draft Policy Brief 
on Managing Fisheries Conflicts: 
Communication and Consensus 
Building in South and Southeast Asia. 
These IEC materials are intended for 
policymakers, conflict management 
practitioners and other stakeholders 
in the field who could be part of the 
conflict management process.
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